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INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 00037

E.O. 12356: N/A

PAGS: ETRD, EAD, PREL, UR, AF

SUBJECT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND  
AID ACCORDS

REF: 87 KABUL 0921<sup>N</sup>

1. SUMMARY: IN MID-1987 THE KABUL REGIME AND SOVIET  
UNION MADE PUBLIC A POLICY OF DIRECT ASSISTANCE BETWEEN  
AFGHAN PROVINCES AND SOVIET REPUBLICS AND PROVINCES THAT  
IN FACT HAD BEGUN ON A LIMITED BASIS IN 1983. DIRECT AID  
PROTOCOLS BETWEEN AFGHAN PROVINCES AND SOVIET REPUBLICS  
MINIMIZE INVOLVEMENT BY KABUL REGIME CENTRAL AUTHORITIES  
IN ADMINISTERING SOVIET ASSISTANCE. CORRUPTION, WASTE,  
AND MISUSE, PROBLEMS THAT HAVE BEEN RIFE IN THE  
DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AND OTHER EAST BLOC AID HAVE LED  
THE SOVIETS TO GO IT ALONE. THE SOVIETS HAVE RECOGNIZED  
THAT THEY MUST NOW TAKE A DIRECT HAND IN BOTH PLANNING  
AND IMPLEMENTING ASSISTANCE EFFORTS EVEN AT THE  
PROVINCIAL LEVEL. BY PUBLICIZING THESE PROTOCOLS, THE

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SOVIETS ARE PUTTING A POSITIVE FACE ON WHAT IS ACTUALLY A  
SOVIET FAILURE AFTER NINE YEARS TO ENFORCE EFFECTIVE,

RESPONSIBLE DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AID BY THEIR AFGHAN  
CLIENTS. THESE PROTOCOLS WHEN AND IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD  
BIND MORE TIGHTLY THE AFGHAN ECONOMY TO THE SOVIET  
ECONOMY. SHOULD THE SOVIET MILITARY WITHDRAW FROM  
AFGHANISTAN, THESE ARRANGEMENTS IF ENFORCED, WOULD ENSURE  
THAT FOR YEARS THE AFGHAN ECONOMY WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY  
THE SOVIET UNION. THESE ARRANGEMENTS SIGNAL A NEW AND  
DEEPER SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHAN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND  
CULTURAL AFFAIRS AT THE TIME WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE  
PORTRAYING THEMSELVES AS ON THE VERGE OF WITHDRAWING FROM  
AFGHANISTAN. END SUMMARY.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AID PROGRAMS TO AFGHANISTAN  
1987: DURING 1987 REGIME AND SOVIET MEDIA ANNOUNCED

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SIGNING OF DOZENS OF PROTOCOLS BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND EAST BLOC AND THE KABUL REGIME. THESE AGREEMENTS COVERED THE GAMUT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, MEDICAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. SOVIET AID TO AFGHANISTAN DATES BACK TO THE 1920S BUT BEGAN IN EARLIER MID-1950S WITH WHAT WERE AT THE TIME MASSIVE MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS. SINCE THE 1978 COUP D'ETAT, ASSISTANCE FROM NON-EAST BLOC COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS HAS ENDED EXCEPT FOR LIMITED UN PROGRAMS. SMALL, BUT EXPANDING INDIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. JOINT DEVELOPMENT DURING 1987 WAS THE PUBLIC EMPHASIS ON SIGNING MID-YEAR ON PROTOCOLS BETWEEN AFGHAN PROVINCES AND COMPARABLE ENTITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION. REGIME OFFICIALS HAVE DESCRIBED THIS AS "PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT IN THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY FROM THE SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW." IN FACT IT

IS THE FAILURE BY THE SOVIETS TO INDUCE THEIR AFGHAN

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IS TO USE AND DISTRIBUTE SOVIET ASSISTANCE ACTIVELY.

FIRST DIRECT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN: THE FIRST DIRECT ASSISTANCE PROTOCOL WAS SIGNED IN 1983, BUT WAS NOT GIVEN MEDIA PLAY. IN LATE 1986 KABUL MEDIA ANNOUNCED NEW ASSISTANCE PROTOCOLS HAD BEEN SIGNED BETWEEN AFGHAN PROVINCES AND SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS. THESE 1986 ACCORDS REPORTEDLY WERE LIMITED IN SCOPE TO EXPEDITING COMMERCE ACROSS THE SOVIET-AFGHAN BORDER BY ELIMINATING THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES LOCATED HUNDREDS OF MILES AWAY AND HINDERED BY UNRELIABLE AND INSECURE TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION LINKS.

SOVIETS BLAME FAILED AID PROGRAMS ON AFGHAN GOVERNMENT INACTION AND INCOMPETENCE: FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE REGIME "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION" POLICY IN LATE 1986, THE SOVIETS LAUNCHED A LARGE-SCALE PROGRAM TO DISTRIBUTE "GRATIS AID" TO RURAL AFGHANS. AFGHAN MEDIA REPORTED SOVIET "PEACE CONVOYS" TRAVELLING FROM THE SOVIET-AFGHAN BORDER BEARING FOODSTUFFS, BLANKETS, BOOTS, COOKING UTENSILS AND SIMILAR ITEMS. THESE GOODS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DISTRIBUTED BY AFGHANS MILITARY AND PARTY CADRE IN

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12356: N/A

1: ETRD, RAID, PREL, UR, AF

SUBJECT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND  
CORRUPT AND INEPT AFGHAN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT CADRE IN  
PROVINCES WHO DID NOT DISTRIBUTE THE AID FAIRLY, SOLD  
FOR THEIR PERSONAL BENEFIT, OR DISTRIBUTED IT TO THEIR  
FAMILIES. PDPA GENERAL SECRETARY NAJIBULLAH AND PRIME  
MINISTER KESHITMAND IN NUMEROUS SPEECHES COMPLAINED THAT  
AFGHANS HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY APPRECIATIVE OF SOVIET  
AID AND THAT FRAUD, CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT  
LIMITED ITS EFFECTIVENESS. IN RECENT MONTHS SOVIET  
AND EAST BLOC DIPLOMATS IN KABUL HAVE VOLUNTEERED  
STRIKING CRITICISMS OF THE KABUL REGIME FOR ITS MISUSE AND  
WASTE OF SOVIET AID.

NEW DIRECT COOPERATION PROTOCOLS SIGNED IN MID-1987:  
DUE TO THE LACK OF PUBLICITY ATTENDING THE  
SIGNATURE OF SOVIET "GRATIS AID" AND THE FOLLOW-UP  
INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE CORRUPTION AND WASTE OF THAT AID,

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SUBJECT: DIRECT COOPERATION PROTOCOL SIGNINGS WERE

ANNOUNCED IN JULY AND AUGUST 1987. BY MID-SEPTEMBER  
AFGHAN MEDIA PROCLAIMED THAT, NOW EACH OF THE 29  
PROVINCES OF AFGHANISTAN AND KHOSHT DIVISION (A MAJOR  
ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT IN PAKTIA PROVINCE) HAS DIRECT TREATY  
AGREEMENTS WITH ONE OR ANOTHER REPUBLIC OR REGION OF THE  
SOVIET UNION. IN OCTOBER 1987, THE KABUL REGIME  
ANNOUNCED THAT SAYED EKREM PAIGER, A MINISTER OF STATE  
HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR "DIRECT COOPERATIVE  
AGREEMENTS." PAIGER IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE PDPA CENTRAL  
COMMISSION FOR AUDITING, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR  
FIGHTING OUT CORRUPTION AND FRAUD WITHIN THE PARTY AND  
GOVERNMENT. THIS APPOINTMENT FURTHER SUGGESTS THAT  
THE AFGHANS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT CORRUPTION FIGURED IN THE SHIFT TO DIRECT  
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS.

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6. KABUL REGIME EXPLANATIONS FOR THE NEW AGREEMENTS: REGIME MEDIA HAVE ADMITTED PROBLEMS WITH THEIR FOREIGN AID USE AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY ECHOING NAJIBULLAH'S oft-stated complaint that provincial development has lagged and that party and government cadre refuse to venture out of Kabul city. A "KABUL NEW TIMES" (THE REGIME'S ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILY) ARTICLE WHICH DESCRIBES THE DIRECT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BLAMES THE FAILURE TO WIN RURAL SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME ON KABUL OFFICIALS WHO DO NOT UNDERSTAND CONDITIONS IN THE PROVINCES: "IT IS . . . NOT A SECRET THAT NOT ALWAYS THESE (CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION) PRIORITIES ARE BASED ON DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF THE REAL NEEDS OF ONE OR ANOTHER PROVINCE." DIRECT COOPERATION AIMS TO CUT OUT THE NON-RESPONSIVE, ILL-INFORMED CENTRAL AUTHORITIES FROM THE PROCESS. THE ARTICLE GOES ON THAT "FROM THE CHAIN OF

LINKS, IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THE INTERMEDIARY LINK IS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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EXCLUDED WHICH AT TIMES DUE TO DIFFERENT REASONS, IN NOT RESPONSIVE ENOUGH TO THE NEEDS OF THE PROVINCES.

7. REGIME DESCRIPTIONS OF SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT COOPERATION EFFORTS: THE KABUL REGIME STRESSES THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CHARACTER OF THE EXCHANGES AND THE MUTUAL BENEFIT FOR BOTH SIDES: THE AGREEMENTS "ENVISAGE THE EXCHANGE OF DELEGATIONS AND GROUPS OF SOCIAL FIGURES, EXPERTS, REPRESENTATIVES OF DIFFERENT STRATA OF THE POPULATION; LINKS BETWEEN THE WORKING COLLECTIVES OF ENTERPRISES AND ORGANIZATIONS, DISPATCH OF SOVIET SPECIALISTS IN THE FIELDS OF MEDICINE, EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, ADMISSION OF MORE YOUTH FROM THE PROVINCES TO EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, COOPERATION OF MASS MEDIA AIMED AT MUTUALLY ACQUAINTING THE POPULATIONS WITH THE TRADITIONS AND THE PRESENT-DAY LIFE OF THE FRATERNAL PEOPLES. GIVEN ARE NOT ONLY CONSUMER GOODS, BUT ALSO MACHINERY FOR ROAD AND BUILDING CONSTRUCTION, FOR DRILLING WATER WELLS AND GENERATING ELECTRIC POWER, FOR LOADING AND TRANSPORTING, EQUIPMENT FOR WORKSHOPS AND SMALL ENTERPRISES, AND FOR MEDICAL ESTABLISHMENTS."

8. SCOPE OF THE PROTOCOLS: THE EXACT NUMBER AND DETAILS OF THE PROTOCOLS ARE UNKNOWN SINCE KABUL MEDIA OFTEN ONLY MAKE OBLIQUE REFERENCES TO THEM AND THE TEXTS OF THE PROTOCOLS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. AT LEAST 25 OF THESE PROTOCOLS WERE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED IN 1987. THEY COVER FIELDS OF EDUCATION, PUBLIC HEALTH, TRAINING OF PROFESSIONAL CADRES, REHABILITATION OF SCHOOLS AND SUPPLY OF MACHINES, POWER GENERATION, SPORTS AND CULTURE. MOST ARE SIGNED BETWEEN A SOVIET PROVINCE (OBLAST) AND AN AFGHAN PROVINCE ALTHOUGH SEVERAL ARE APPARENTLY BETWEEN A SOVIET REPUBLIC AND AN AFGHAN PROVINCE. THE CITIES OF

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: ETRD, EAD, PREL, UR, AF

SUBJECT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND  
KABUL AND KANDAHAR HAVE ESTABLISHED CITY-TO-CITY  
AGREEMENTS WITH MOSCOW AND ALMA ATA RESPECTIVELY. IN  
ADDITION, A FEW PROTOCOLS HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED BETWEEN  
UNIONS, SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTES.  
A TYPICAL PROTOCOL IS THAT SIGNED BY AZERBAIJAN AND  
PAKTIKA PROVINCE, A REMOTE, SPARSELY POPULATED AREA IN  
SOUTHEAST AFGHANISTAN WITH NO URBAN CENTERS AND LITTLE  
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT. IT REPORTEDLY INCLUDES THE  
GIFT OF MATERIALS TOTALLING 2 MILLION RUBLES DURING 1987-  
88, ASSISTANCE IN PLANNING AND EQUIPPING OF A 200-PUPIL  
BOARDING SCHOOL, ASSISTANCE IN PLANNING AND EQUIPPING  
FURNITURE WORKSHOPS, ASSISTANCE IN DRILLING WELLS,  
SETTING UP OF A SHOP NAMED "FRIENDSHIP" FOR SELLING  
AZERBAIJANIAN GOODS. IT ALSO PROPOSES TO STUDY THE  
POSSIBILITIES OF DELIVERING PAKTIKA PRODUCE TO  
AZERBAIJAN. GOODS GIVEN TO THE PROVINCE INCLUDE

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TRANSPORT, WELL DRILLING MACHINERY, PRE-FABRICATED

BUILDINGS AND AIRCRAFT HANGARS, CONSTRUCTION MACHINERY,  
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, EQUIPMENT  
FOR MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SCHOOLS.

5. PROTOCOLS SIGNED IN 1987: THE FOLLOWING LISTS  
AFGHAN PROVINCES AND THE SOVIET COUNTERPARTS THAT  
REPORTEDLY SIGNED AGREEMENTS DURING 1987. NOTE THE  
EMPHASIS ON LINKS BETWEEN CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND THE  
NORTHERN AFGHAN PROVINCES.

NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN

- BADAKHSHAN PROVINCE -- TADZHIK SSR

- BALKH PROVINCE -- MARAU PROVINCE, TURKMEN SSR

- FARKH PROVINCE -- SURKHAN DARYA PROVINCE, UZBEK SSR

- FARIAB PROVINCE -- GHARJOL PROVINCE, TURKMEN SSR

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AFGHANISTAN  
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- KUNDUZ PROVINCE -- KUNDUZ PROVINCE, TADZHIK SSR  
- TAKHAR PROVINCE -- TADZHIK PROVINCE, TADZHIK SSR  
CENTRAL AFGHANISTAN  
- BAMIAN PROVINCE -- UZBEK SSR  
- GHAZNI PROVINCE -- MOLDAVIAN REPUBLIC, USSR  
- GHOR PROVINCE -- ARMENIAN SSR  
- KABUL PROVINCE -- CHECHEN-INGUSH PROVINCE, RSFSR  
- KAPIS PROVINCE -- UKRAINE SSR  
- KOGAT PROVINCE -- ARMENIAN SSR; KIRGHIZ SSR  
- PAKTIK PROVINCE -- KHARKOV PROVINCE, UKRAINE SSR  
EASTERN AFGHANISTAN  
- KUNAR PROVINCE -- MINSK PROVINCE, BELORUSSIAN SSR  
- PAKTIA PROVINCE -- KIRGHIZ SSR; AZERBAIJAN  
- KHOSH DIVISION -- AZERBAIJAN  
- AKTALA PROVINCE -- AZERBAIJAN

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WESTERN AFGHANISTAN

- NIMROZ PROVINCE -- KHERSON PROVINCE, UKRAINE SSR

10. SOVIET INTENT TO LINK NORTHERN AFGHAN PROVINCES TO  
SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS: THE SOVIET SPECIAL  
INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN'S NORTHERN PROVINCES HAS ECONOMIC

AS WELL AS THE OBVIOUS DEFENSIVE BENEFITS. ECONOMICALLY,  
NATURAL GAS, WHICH REMAINS AFGHANISTAN'S MOST IMPORTANT  
EXPORT PRODUCT HAS BEEN SENT THROUGH PIPELINES TO THE  
SOVIET UNION SINCE THE 1960S. OTHERWISE THERE HAS BEEN  
LITTLE COMMERCE BETWEEN REGIONS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE  
BORDER. THE POLICY OF SIGNING PROTOCOLS COVERING A RANGE  
OF TITLES BETWEEN CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND THE  
NORTHERN AFGHAN PROVINCES EFFECTIVELY STRENGTHENS THE  
CROSS-BORDER ECONOMIC TIES WHILE WEAKENING THE WELL-  
ESTABLISHED NETWORKS, TRADE RELATIONS AND INTERDEPENDENCE  
AMONG NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN REGIONS AND OTHER PARTS OF THE  
COUNTRY. AFGHANISTAN'S RUDIMENTARY TRANSPORT SYSTEM AND  
THE LACK OF PROCESSING FACILITIES HAVE PREVENTED NORTHERN  
AFGHANISTAN FROM REALIZING ITS VAST AGRICULTURAL  
POTENTIAL. THE NEW SOVIET-AFGHAN ARRANGEMENTS MAY LEAD  
TO AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES  
WHICH COMPLEMENTS THE ECONOMIES OF THE SOVIET CENTRAL  
ASIAN REPUBLICS. AFGHAN AGRICULTURE MAY SHIFT TO A  
GREATER FURNANCE ON CASH CROPS INCLUDING COTTON AND SUGAR  
BEETS WHICH CAN BE PROCESSED AT SOVIET PLANTS. THE NEW  
RELATIONS MAY ALSO INVOLVE EVENTUAL MOVEMENT OF SURPLUS  
SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN WORKERS TO RELATIVELY UNDER-  
POPULATED NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN. ACCORDING TO AFGHANS  
FROM THE NORTHERN PROVINCES, SOME SOVIET CENTRAL ASIANS  
HAVE ALREADY MOVED INTO KANDAHAR, THE LARGEST CITY  
IN THE NORTH.

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SUBJECT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND

11. SOVIET RATIONALES FOR TURNING TO DIRECT COOPERATION:

THE SOVIET SHORT-TERM PURPOSE FOR DIRECT COOPERATION IS

POSSIBLY TO REALIZE A BETTER RETURN ON ITS ASSISTANCE TO

AFGHANISTAN, SPECIFICALLY TO BUILD SUPPORT IN THE

PROVINCES AND AMONG RURAL PEOPLES IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE

MILITARY SITUATION. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS PROBABLY

INCLUDE:

-- SOVIETS ABANDONMENT OF EFFORTS TO FORGE AN EFFECTIVE

AFGHAN ADMINISTRATION: GIVEN THE COMPLAINTS ABOUT SOVIET

AID BEING WASTED, DIVERTED AND NOT HAVING ITS DESIRED

EFFECT, THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE REALIZED THAT THE KABUL

REGIME LACKS THE POTENTIAL TO DISTRIBUTE EFFECTIVELY

SOVIET AID, AT LEAST AT THIS TIME. THE SOVIETS THEREFORE

MAY HAVE DECIDED TO DELIVER THE AID DIRECTLY FROM THE

SOVIET UNION INSTEAD OF ROUTING IT PHYSICALLY OR

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ADMINISTRATIVELY THROUGH THE KABUL REGIME.

-- THE PROTOCOLS REASSURE NERVOUS CADRE THAT THE SOVIETS

ARE IN AFGHANISTAN TO STAY: AS SOVIET PROPAGANDA

INCREASINGLY SPEAKS OF A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, SKITTISH

AFGHAN CADRE MAY SEEK ASSURANCES THAT A SOVIET PRESENCE

WILL CONTINUE AFTER THE MILITARY LEAVES AND THAT SOVIETS

WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT LEVERAGE OVER THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT

TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF SOVIET CLIENTS.

-- SOVIETS INTEND TO MAKE AFGHANISTAN SO DEPENDENT ON IT

THAT NO FUTURE AFGHAN REGIME WILL BE ABLE TO RESIST

SOVIET DICTATES: SHOULD THE SOVIET MILITARY WITHDRAW,

OBLIGATIONS AND INDEBTEDNESS TO THE SOVIETS WILL BE SO

GREAT THAT NO AFGHAN REGIME COULD DISREGARD SOVIET

WISHES. GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY GUARANTEES THAT NO AFGHAN

REGIME COULD RENOUNCE THE OBLIGATIONS INCURRED BY PDPA

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UPPER REGIMES TO THE SOVIET UNION.

SOVIETS PUNISH NATIONALITIES POLICY. SOCIALLY, THE POPULATIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN BORDER, ARE ETHNICALLY THE SAME. MANY RESIDENTS IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN ARE REFUGEES WHO FLED FROM CENTRAL ASIA DURING THE 1920S AND 1930S. LIMITED VISITS BY AFGHANS TO THEIR RELATIVES ACROSS THE BORDER HAD BEEN ALLOWED BEFORE 1978 AND MAY HAVE BEEN PERMITTED SINCE. AFTER THE 1978 COUP SOVIET EFFORTS TO CULTIVATE SUPPORT AMONG THESE POPULATIONS OF NORTH AFGHANISTAN HAVE FOLLOWED THE FAMILIAR "DIVIDE AND RULE" TACTICS OF THE SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY. SOVIET-WRITTEN AFGHAN TEXTBOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS AND RADIO PROGRAMS HAVE ALL STRESSED AFGHAN ETHNIC IDENTITIES PARALLELING THE SOVIET DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN UZBEKS, TURKMEN, TADZHIKS AND THE

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EEK. GIVEN THE RELATIVELY HIGHER MATERIAL LIVING CONDITIONS IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA, THE SOVIETS MAY BELIEVE THAT INCREASED CONTACT BETWEEN AFGHANS AND THEIR ETHNIC COUNTERPARTS IN CENTRAL ASIA WILL WIN GREATER AFGHAN SUPPORT FOR SOVIET AND PDPA POLICIES. THIS IS A HIGH RISK POLICY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS SEEK TO INFLUENCE IF AFGHANS WHILE AVOIDING THE SPREAD TO THEIR CENTRAL ASIAN POPULATIONS OF ISLAMIC SENTIMENTS AND ISLAMIC-SPINNED OPPOSITION TO SLAVIC POLITICAL DOMINATION IN CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS.

DIRECT COOPERATION WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS DERIVING FROM THE FAILURE OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO WIN SUPPORT FOR THE PDPA. THE WASTE, CORRUPTION AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN WILL NOT BE RESOLVED THROUGH THIS SCHEME FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

SOVIETS WILL NOT ALLOW PROVINCE-TO-PROVINCE OR PROVINCE-TO-REPUBLIC ASSISTANCE WITHOUT FIRM CONTROL BY SOVIET CENTRAL AUTHORITIES. APPEARANCES NOTWITHSTANDING, DIRECT COOPERATION PROTOCOLS WILL NOT RESULT IN DIRECT LINKS. EVEN IF SOVIET PROVINCES DID EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THEIR SIDE OF THE AGREEMENTS, AFGHAN PROVINCIAL BUREAUCRACIES ARE INCAPABLE OF ADMINISTERING SUCH PROGRAMS. THE TYPES OF TRAIT AND CORRUPTION WHICH AGGRAVATE THE CENTRALLY ADMINISTERED AID PROGRAMS WOULD BE EVEN GREATER IN SUCH DIRECT COOPERATION ACTIVITIES BECAUSE THE OFFICIALS CHARGED WITH MONITORING AND ENSURING LOCAL OFFICIALS ARE HUNDREDS OF MILES AWAY IN KARUL. FURTHERMORE, THE RECENT TENDENCY TO APPOINT DOMINANT LOCAL FIGURES, INCLUDING FORMER MUJAHIDIN

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 06 KABUL 00037

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: ETRD, EAID, PREL, UR, AF

SUBJECT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND  
COMMANDERS, TO ADMINISTER THEIR NATIVE PROVINCES AND  
DISTRICTS IN AN EFFORT TO FOSTER THE APPEARANCE OF  
INDIRECT RULE CREATES A SITUATION RIFE FOR FRAUD AND  
CORRUPTION. EVEN BEFORE 1978 WHEN THE PROVINCIAL AND  
DISTRICT BUREAUCRATS HAD SOME PROFESSIONAL SKILLS,  
CENTRAL AUTHORITIES EXERCISED TIGHT CONTROL OVER THEM,  
AND THERE WAS A STRICT POLICY OF NEVER ASSIGNING ANY  
ADMINISTRATOR (#)

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATORS WERE NOT ENTRUSTED TO  
ADMINISTER AID. NOTHING SUGGESTS THAT THE HIGHLY  
CENTRALIZED AFGHAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE HAS CHANGED  
TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE (#)

(#) THAT IT WAS  
PROVINCIAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO WERE  
IMPLICATED IN THE SCANDALS INVOLVING FRAUD AND WASTE OF

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SOVIET GRATIS AID IN 1987.

-- SECURITY PROBLEMS IN PROVINCES: SECURITY IN THE  
PROVINCES IS SO POOR THAT IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO CONSIDER

UNDERTAKING ASSISTANCE PROJECTS THERE THAT REQUIRE A  
CONTINUED PRESENCE OF PERSONNEL. THE UNITED NATIONS AND  
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS HAVE RESTRICTED  
THEIR STAFF TO KABUL BECAUSE OF SECURITY CONCERNS  
ELSEWHERE IN AFGHANISTAN, EVEN IN THE REASONABLY SECURE  
CITIES OF MAZAR-I SHARIF AND HERAT. WHILE SOVIET EXPERTS  
AND TECHNICIANS CAN RELY ON SOVIET MILITARY SECURITY IN THE  
PROVINCES, THEIR INEVITABLE PRE-OCCUPATION WITH SECURITY  
WILL PLAY HAVOC WITH ORGANIZING EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE  
PROGRAMS.

AFGHAN CADRE REFUSE TO WORK OUTSIDE OF KABUL: IN THE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



1990年12月15日

PROVINCES ARE INCAPABLE OF ABSORBING ASSISTANCE: EVEN  
VILLAGES AND TOWNS UNDER NOMINAL REGIME CONTROL THE  
BASIC PUBLIC SERVICES, ELECTRICITY, WATER, ROAD  
TRANSPORT, HEALTH CARE, ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS, COLLECTION  
AND FEES ARE NOT BEING PROVIDED. IF PROVINCIAL  
GOVERNMENTS CANNOT PERFORM AT THIS MOST BASIC LEVEL THEN  
IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE PROVINCES TO ABSORB THE BENEFITS OF  
THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT (S) BUILDING A

OFFICIAL USE

HOSPITAL OR WORKSHOP IS OF LITTLE (4)

1. NAME \_\_\_\_\_

**BY HANDOUTS.**

11

EDUCATION, DEDICATION OF EFFORTS,

OF SOVIET INSTITUTIONAL LIFE

UGGESTS THAT THE HURRY O



RAY JOYCE A  
KABUL 37

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PROTOCOLS ARE GUIDED BY (#)

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MEMEASSY KABUL

ECSTATE WASHDC 7841

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

EMBASSY NEW DELHI

INSUL PESHAWAR

EMBASSY MOSCOW

LTD OFFICIAL USE SECTION 06 OF 06 KABUL 00037

12356: N/A

: ETRD, EADD, PREL, UR, AT

ECT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND  
PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT AIMED  
GENUINE DIRECT COOPERATION BETWEEN PROVINCES BUT ONLY  
ARE A MASK TO HIDE THE SOVIET FAILURE TO WORK THROUGH  
CLIENTS. THE SOVIETS HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THEY MUST  
TAKE A DIRECT HAND IN BOTH PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING  
ASSISTANCE EFFORTS EVEN AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL. THIS  
IS A NEW AND GREATER SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHAN  
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS AT THE TIME WHEN  
SOVIETS (#)

FROM AFGHANISTAN.

MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MCWILLIAMS

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